

Does the night shift still pay?

A comparative analysis of pay-related working time provisions in European collective agreements

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BARTIME

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Most Collective Agreements (CBAs) fix pay levels based on a standard working week and typically include provisions for monetary rewards related to non-standard working hours. However, there is a lack of understanding of the specificities of these provisions across European countries. BARTIME examines the rewards for non-standard hours across 24 EU countries. BARTIME aims to contribute to the social dialogue in Europe by deepening the understanding of monetary rewards of non-standard working time arrangements and the related agreements in collective bargaining.

BARTIME is led by the WageIndicator Foundation and is joined in the project by University of Utrecht, Central European Labour Studies Institute (CELSI) and the University of Girona. The European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) is associate partner to the project.

WageIndicator Foundation

WageIndicator Foundation is a global, independent, non-profit organisation operating in 208 countries across the world that collects, analyses and shares information on Minimum Wages, Salaries, Living Wages, Living Income and Living Tariff, Labour Laws, Collective Agreements and Gig and Platform Work. It aims to improve labour market transparency for workers, employers and policy makers worldwide by providing accessible labour market information worldwide through 220 websites in 70+ national languages.

Utrecht University

University of Utrecht (UU), Department of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, in the Netherlands is one of the largest Dutch universities with over 35,000 students. The Department of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences has a staff of more than a hundred professors, assistant professors, and PhD and post doc researchers. Its research covers issues such as discrimination in the job market, reintegration at work, growing up in a multicultural neighbourhood, developing your individual identity, high-risk behaviour in young people, growing inequality and the accessibility of care.

Central European Labour Studies Institute (CELSI)

Central European Labour Studies Institute (CELSI) is a non-profit research institute based in Bratislava, Slovakia. It fosters multidisciplinary research about the functioning of labour markets and institutions, work and organizations, business and society, and ethnicity and migration in the economic, social, and political life of modern societies. CELSI strives to make a contribution to the cutting-edge international scientific discourse.

University of Girona

The University of Girona's Department of Economics is affiliated to the Faculty of Economics and Business Sciences and offers teaching in several bachelor's and master's degree studies. The department is very active in research and its interests range from statistics, applied economics and health to public economics, services and industry. Its research covers issues such as labor economics, monetary policy, basic income, transition economies, and the impact of education on the labor market.

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Bibliographical information

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1. Introduction

Working time is one of the most common topics included in collective agreements (Besamusca et al., 2018; Besamusca & Tjeldens, 2015; Tjeldens, 2021a). Indeed, in most cases, it would be near impossible to interpret collectively bargained provisions on pay and other working conditions without some reference to the time frame to which they apply (Ilsøe, 2012; Piasna et al., 2024; Rubery et al., 2005). Standard working hours define the effort an employee must make to earn a full-time salary (Rubery et al., 2005). To do so, collective agreements commonly clarify not only how many hours are considered standard hours, but also define the regular operating hours within which these hours are to be made, whether or not employees are entitled to supplemental payments when they work hours exceeding the agreed volume (i.e., overtime) or when they work hours falling outside the regular operating hours (e.g., night shifts, weekend work) (Besamusca et al., 2018; Gomez & Lamb, 2019; Ilsøe, 2012; Peetz et al., 2019; Tjeldens, 1998, 2021a).

The BARTIME project on the monetary rewards of working time dimensions in collective bargaining and in the working population, funded by the European Commission's Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (Project No. 101126498), studies the pay associated with three dimensions of working time arrangements in 24 EU member states: (a) the length of the working week, including part-time, overtime and the number of working days per year; (b) work outside of core working hours (9 to 5), such as shifts, evenings, weekends, and nights; and (c) the variability and predictability of working day start and end times, including on-call work and the extent to which workers have control over these hours.

This report, which constitutes deliverable 2.4 of the BARTIME project, reports the findings from a comparative analysis of provisions on standard and non-standard working times in collective agreements in EU member states, with a focus on pay. Together with a literature review on developments in bargaining on pay for working time (Besamusca, 2025) and two expert meetings with trade unionists, employers, policy makers and academics, this report asks how pay for working time is negotiated in collective agreements. These studies do not investigate working time patterns or wage levels per se: They focus exclusively on the *relationship* between pay and working time in collective bargaining.

The aim of this comparative report was, first, to provide insights regarding the extent to which and the way in which pay-related working time provisions are included in collective agreements across EU Member States and economic sectors. Using the WageIndicator CBA Database (Medas et al., 2024), this report gives an overview of the bargaining agenda on pay and working time by providing an overview of commonly (and infrequently) included provisions on pay-related working time. Where possible, the report also shows at which levels these provisions tend to be negotiated across countries and sectors. Secondly, this report builds on the BARTIME literature study (Besamusca, 2025) and asks to what extent and how the developments identified in the literature on bargaining on working time, manifest in the texts of collective agreements.

In the following sections of this report, I first briefly introduce the WageIndicator CBA Database that is used for the analyses in this report. Section 3 gives an overview of pay-related provisions

regarding standard working time. Section 4 discusses the extent to which level at which collective agreements in Europe include pay-related provisions for non-standard working hours.

2. The WageIndicator CBA Database

To examine pay-related provisions on working time in European collective agreements, I make use of the WageIndicator CBA Database, which contains coded data about the provisions included in collective agreements. The CBA Database follows a harmonized coding scheme that was developed and improved over time. Extensive descriptions of the collection of collective agreement, the protocols for preparing these agreements of online publication and for coding, and the coding scheme, are made available on the database's website¹ and in its codebook (Medas et al., 2024). These collective agreements were collected in the context of a multiple projects funded by the European Commission's DG for Employment and Social Affairs' social dialogue grants, including the BARCOM project (2016-2018, VP/2015/004), the COLBAR project (2019-2021, VS/2019/0077), BARCOVID (2021-2023, VS/2021/0190), BARWAGE (2022-2024, 101052319), BARMETAL (2022-2024, 101052331), BARSERVICE (2023-2025, 101126532) and BARTIME (2023-2025, 101126498).

2.1 The studied collective agreements

The WageIndicator Database currently contains over 3000 collective agreements, including 2001 agreements from all EU Member States (see Figure 1). Due to the complexity of bargaining systems and sometimes low accessibility of collective agreement texts, the database does not currently contain representative samples (Besamusca et al., 2022; Tijdens, 2021b; Tijdens et al., 2022), although this is a medium term aim of the BARTIME consortium. Due to challenges in the collection or coding of collective agreements, the database includes relatively few agreements from Belgium (8), Cyprus (5), Ireland (2), Latvia (4) and Malta (6). Figure 1 contains an overview of the number of collective agreements included from each EU Member State. Samples of over 100 collective agreements are available from eight countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain).

¹ <https://wageindicator.org/labour-laws/collective-bargaining-agreements>




Figure 1 - Sample size by country

The database includes collective agreements from all NACE 2001 sectors, except from activities of private households (see Figure 2); a single collective agreement from an extraterritorial organization is included. Samples of over 100 collective agreements are available from the manufacturing, commerce, transportation, education and human health sectors.




Figure 2 - sample size by sector

The included collective agreements primarily cover the period from 2013 to 2024. As the later work packages of the BARTIME project aims to compare provisions from the collective agreements to labour market outcomes found in the 2012, 2018 and 2022 European Structure of Earnings Surveys (Eurostat, 2014, 2021), a relatively large share of the collective agreements is valid in those years.

The start years of the collective agreements, i.e., the years in which the coded agreement came into effect, range from 1960 to 2025. Some collective agreements have start data going back as far as the 1960s or 1970s because they were negotiated in countries in which bargaining traditions differ from most other EU Member States: where bargaining partners in most Member States adopt new collective agreements every one to four years or so (publishing a consolidated, up to date text), Belgian and French bargaining partners repeatedly amend the original collective agreement, publishing amendments rather than consolidated texts. The actual data from the Belgian and French agreements, however, are more recent. The iterations of these collective agreements that were coded for the purpose of the CBA database, were always from 2000 or after.




Figure 3- Sample of collective agreement, by start year of the CBA

While all collective agreements include a start date, they do not necessarily include an end date in the negotiated text. About 80% of the collective agreements do effectively include end dates (see Figure 4), at which the agreements expire (i.e., signatories are no longer bound by the text; potentially because a new agreement has been adopted) or become ultra-active (i.e., in the absence of a new agreement, the terms included in the agreement continue to apply to the CBA signatories). These end dates range from the year 2000 to 2032, with the large majority falling between 2016 and 2027 (see Figure 4). In the analyses following trends over time, the end year is sometimes used instead of the start year to avoid statistical complications related to the inclusion of a few historical start dates (c.f. Figure 3).




Figure 4 - Sample of collective agreement, by end year of the CBA

2.2 Measures of provisions on pay-related overtime

Collective agreements included in the WageIndicator CBA Database are coded on 14 macro-topics, including: meta data, job titles, social security and pensions, training, employment contracts, sickness and disability, health and medical assistance, work-family arrangements, gender equality provisions, wages, working hours, workers representation and conflicts, new technologies and green clauses, and coverage. This report focuses on the working time and wage related variables.

In regard to standard working time, the WageIndicator CBA Database coders were asked whether the collective agreements included any provisions on working time at all. For those agreements that did so (92%), coders were then asked to indicate whether or not the agreement contained agreed standard working times per day, per week, per month and per year. For all time units for which standard hours has been agreed, coders were asked at which levels there agreed hours were set (e.g., 38 hours per week). Finally, coders were asked whether the agreements contain any flexible work arrangements, previously analysed by Brega and co-authors (2024). Coders could choose from an extensive list of flexible work arrangements, including two options that are relevant to working time: flexible working time and the right to request a change of work status (e.g., from full-time to part-time). Table 1 shows an overview of these core variables relating to standard working times.

Table 1 - Overview of core indicators related to standard working time

Indicators measuring standard working hours	
workhours_trigger	Binary indicator (yes/no) measuring whether the collective agreements contains any provisions on working time at all
Provisions fixing work hours	Four binary variables (yes/no) measure whether the collective agreement contains standard working hours per day, week, month and year
Standard daily working hours	A variable measuring the number of hours in a standard working day
Standard weekly working hours	A variable measuring the number of hours in a standard working week
Standard monthly working hours	A variable measuring the number of hours in a standard working month
Standard annual working hours	A variable measuring the number of hours in a standard working year
Flexible hours	A binary (yes/no) indicator measuring whether the agreement contains provisions for flexible working hours.
Right to request change in part-time/full-time work status	A binary (yes/no) indicator measuring whether the agreement contains provisions granting the right to request a change in work status (e.g., from part-time to full-time or vice versa).

In regard to measures on the payment of non-standard hours, the WageIndicator CBA Database contains indicators relating to part-time workers, overtime work, night work, work on Sunday and shift work.

Table 2 - Overview of core indicators related to non-standard working time

Indicators measuring pay for non-standard working hours	
Part-time worker exclusions	Binary indicator (yes/no) measuring whether part-time workers are excluded from any provisions of the collective agreement, followed by an open question asking coders to detail which provisions part-time workers are excluded from.
Overtime work (trigger)	A binary variables (yes/no) measuring whether the collective agreement contains provisions on premium pay for overtime work.
Sunday work (trigger)	A binary variables (yes/no) measuring whether the collective agreement contains provisions on premium pay for Sunday work
Night work (trigger)	A binary variables (yes/no) measuring whether the collective agreement contains provisions on premium pay for night work
Shift work (trigger)	A binary variables (yes/no) measuring whether the collective agreement contains provisions on premium pay for shift work

Allowance type	Three variables measuring how overtime, Sunday and shift work hours are compensated. Answer options include payments in money (fixed amount percentage of regular wage, percentage of minimum wage), in time off, a mix of money and time, or other options (incl. insufficient information and references to the law).
Level of premium	Four variables measure at which level of regular wages premiums for overtime hours, Sunday work, night work and shift work are paid.

3. The work-effort bargain: how many hours do employees work for a full-time salary?

3.1 Defining standard working hours in collective agreements

Standard working time determines the number of hours an employee should work to be considered a full-time worker (Ilsøe, 2012; Rubery et al., 2005). The BARTIME literature review indicated that “the primary development in regard to the length of the standard workweek [over the last two decades] was that it became less uniformly defined”. The determination of standard work hours become more de-centralized (i.e., determined at firm rather than sector levels), as well as less stable over the year and more varying between different workings in a firm. The studies included in the literature review notes a shift from stable weekly working hours, to fluctuating hours that are meant to average out to the agreed standard working hours over a period of time, e.g., an average working week of 38 hours calculated over each three month period or over a year (annualized hours) (Arrowsmith, 2007; Haipeter & Lehndorff, 2005; Ilsøe, 2010; Leede et al., 2007). Previous studies also found increases in the opportunities for individual employees or employers to deviate from collectively bargained standard working times. This happened, for instance by setting standard working times at the firm level, the facilitation of employment contracts without guaranteed hours, or by offering employees the choice to work shorter or longer work hours than negotiated in exchange for more or fewer annual leave days (Berg et al., 2004, 2014; Boumans, 2022; Ibsen & Keune, 2018; Leede et al., 2007; Schulten, 2019). Finally, some studies noted the resurgence of a four-day workweek debate, although primarily at the firm level and often limited to high-paying firms (Delaney & Casey, 2022; Mullens & Glorieux, 2023; Piasna et al., 2024; Schor et al., 2023).

The analyses of the CBA Database indicate that about three quarters (1519 out of 2001) collective agreements contain some definition of the number of hours that are considered standard hours. The remaining 25% of agreements, this lets the determination of standard working time up to individual employers (or potentially to firm level bargaining), which might be interpreted as support for previous findings regarding the decentralization of bargaining on working time.

The 1519 collective agreements that agree on standard working hours, differ in regard to the unit used to define standard working hours (e.g., per month, per year). As figure 5 shows, the collective

agreements in the sample most frequently fix weekly working hours (62%), followed by daily hours (34%), annual hours (18%) and, finally, monthly hours (2%).




Figure 5 - Share of CBAs that fix standard working hours per week, day, year and month

As the attentive reader may notice, the percentages in Figure 5 exceed a total of 100%. The analyses of collective agreements do indeed reveal that many collective agreements will define standard working times in reference to multiple time units (e.g., per week *and* per year). As Figure 6 shows, the largest group of collective agreements (560) still only fixes weekly working hours, followed by collective agreements defining both weekly and daily working hours (506 agreements). Together, these two patterns of defining standard working hours cover about half of all collective agreements in the sample. All other ways of fixing standard working hours, are less common than not fixing working hours at all.

While these findings suggest the continued dominance of standard weekly working hours, this need not necessarily indicate that annualized hours aren't on the rise. A qualitative reading of collective agreements and discussions with the team of coders show that collective agreements that fix weekly working hours will sometimes state that employees' working hours are supposed to *average* the negotiated standard weekly hours over a period of time, even if they do not define the level of annual working hours.




Figure 6 - Combinations of units by which standard work hours are defined in collective agreements

3.2 The length of the standard working week

Since weekly working hours were the most common unit to defining standard working hours, this section examines differences and commonalities in the level of agreed *weekly* working hours. Figures comparing average agreed standard working hours by day, month and year are included in the statistical appendix at the end of this report.

The average weekly working hours across the 1234 collective agreements that contained agreed weekly working hours, was 39 hours per week. Virtually all collective agreements (99%) in the sample fixed hours at levels equivalent to at least 35 hours per week. As Figure 7 shows, agreements that contain provisions setting lower working hours are almost exclusively from the education sector, where collective agreements sometimes regulate the number of ‘contact hours’ (i.e. hours spent teaching pupils or students) rather than the hours spent working (c.f., including preparation of lesson plans, grading, etc.). One Estonian CBA in education regulates the maximum number of contact hours (i.e., hours teaching students) at 600 annually. In Malta, a collective agreement sets the school day at 5.5 hours and 27.5 hours per week; an Italian collective agreement sets it at 5.6 hours per day and 34 per week. One Greek firm level collective agreement in the cosmetics sector reduced the work week from 38 to 33 hours per week in 2013, but this came at the expense of a 12.5% pay cut. On average, however, differences across sectors were surprisingly small. Regression analyses (not shown) indicate that, compared to agriculture and fishery, only four sectors set significantly lower weekly working hours on average (mining, ICT, finance & insurance, public administration, and education) and one set significantly higher hours (hospitality).




Figure 7 - average weekly working hours in collective agreements, by sector

Across countries, agreed weekly working hours vary from 36.5 hours on average in Belgium to on average in 41.3 in Hungary (Figure 8). Only 3% of collective agreements set weekly work hours above 40 hours per week. Most of these agreements tend to include provisions that state that 'weekly working hours inclusive of overtime' may go up to the stated number of weekly working hours. This, in itself, might be an indication that these agreements are applying annualized hours, and are effectively setting the range within actual weekly working hours might vary (e.g., when hours need to average out to 38 hours per week over each quarter, but may not exceed 43 hours in any week). Austrian, Hungarian and Slovenian agreements do so more often than other countries. Furthermore, the taxi sector appear to set comparatively long hours: the Austrian taxi sector sets a regular standard working week of 55 hours; in the Dutch taxi sector this is 48 hours. Regression analyses show that compared to Austria, only Hungary and Romania have significantly higher standard weekly working hours on average. On the other hand, collective agreements fixed significantly lower average weekly working hours in (Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain).




Figure 8 - average weekly working hours in collective agreements, by country

The analyses also show that collective agreements commonly included provisions related to flexible work or the right to request a change of work status (e.g., from part-time to full-time or vice versa). However, the inclusion of such provisions differed strongly across countries. As Figure 9 shows, almost no flexible work provisions were identified in Ireland, Estonia or in sector-level agreements in France. While this might be due to low sample size in Ireland and due to the inclusion of such agreements in firm level rather than sector level agreements in France, the virtual absence of any provisions on flexible work hours across 114 Estonian agreements seems remarkable. Among the other Member States, the share of collective agreements including provisions on flexible working hours ranged from 10% in Lithuania to 60% in Italy. While the Figure shows 70% of Maltese agreements contained such provisions, the low sample size merits a careful interpretation of this finding.

Provisions regarding the right to change work status were included in half of the collective agreements from Bulgaria and Italy (Figure 10). These clauses were uncommon (included in less than 20% of CBAs) from Luxembourg, Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, Croatia, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Sweden and Greece. No such provisions were found in Poland, Malta, Latvia, Ireland, France, Estonia, Germany, Cyprus and Belgium. Options to elect shorter or longer contractual work weeks in exchange for more or fewer annual leave days and the availability of employment contracts without guaranteed hours, flagged as important in the literature review, were not coded in the CBA Database.




Figure 9 - Share of collective agreements with flexible working time provisions, by country




Figure 10 - Share of collective agreements with the right to request a change in work status, by country

4. Provisions for premium pay for non-standard hours

4.1 Pay-related provisions on divergence from the number of standard working hours

Non-standard hours are hours that diverge from the agreed standard working and operating hours, either upwardly or downwardly, or in regard to the time at which the employee is working. In the labour market, working fewer hours than the negotiated full-time standard (i.e., part-time work), is associated with penalties (Chung, 2020; Lirio et al., 2008; McDonald et al., 2005; Stovell & Besamusca, 2022). In accordance with EU legislation, it is forbidden for collective agreements to discriminate against part-time workers. However, part-time workers may be excluded from some parts of the collectively negotiated provisions. Of the 2001 collective agreements analysed in this study, 27 agreements (1.35%) excluded part-time workers from some of the negotiated provisions. Among the provisions that part-time workers are most often excluded from, coders of the CBA Database have listed entitlements to overtime payments (which only kick in after the standard working hours have been exceeded), working time flexibility provisions, severance pay, the sectoral training fund, and health care arrangements. Employees working under 8 hours per week were entirely excluded from one collective agreement.

Contrary to the limited bargaining about shorter than standard working hours, longer hours (i.e., overtime) were an issue that was much more commonly included on the bargaining agenda. The BARTIME literature review found several studies indicating challenges in negotiating premium pay for such hours (Boumans, 2024; Gomez & Lamb, 2019; Peetz et al., 2019), but primarily pointed towards the consequences of annualized hours: hours worked in excess of the standard hours were often 'banked' in time accounts in order to be compensated by shorter working weeks in the future rather than paid out in overtime hours (Berg et al., 2004; Haipeter & Lehndorff, 2005; Ilsøe, 2012; Lehndorff, 2007). While the latter is an issue of *access* to negotiated premiums and cannot be assessed in this study (it is the focus of two other BARTIME studies comparing collective agreements to labour market outcomes), this report does examine the inclusion and level of overtime premiums (as well as of other premiums for inconvenient hours in section 4.2).

As Figure 11 shows, premiums for overtime work were commonly included in collective agreements in most EU Member States. Premium pay for overtime was included in all analyses collective agreements from Sweden (n=38) and Cyprus (n=5). They were included in about 90% of collective agreements from Austria, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia. There were, however, also six Member States where less than half of the agreements contained premiums for overtime work (Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Slovakia). This was least so in Belgium, but this is expected to have little impact on working conditions as overtime premiums are regulated by law. As Figure 12 shows, there were large differences across sectors too, which relatively few agreements containing overtime premiums in the Finance, professional services, education, and entertainment sectors. Additional regression analyses (not shown) show that recent collective agreements were marginally less likely to include overtime provisions than agreements from the early 2000s.




Figure 11 - Share of collective agreement including premiums for overtime work, by country




Figure 12 - Share of collective agreement including premiums for overtime work, by sector

The analyses indicated that payment of overtime hours is most commonly negotiated as extra wage payments, either as a fix amount, a percentage of regular wages, or of the minimum wage. Figure 13 shows that over half of the agreements in the sample, negotiated overtime payments in this manner. Over a quarter of agreements (670) contained no premiums for overtime pay, and

the remainder either compensated overtime hours through time off work in other weeks, or a combination of extra pay and time.




Figure 13 - Type of payment agreed for overtime work

4.2 Pay-related provisions for hours worked outside of regular operating hours

Finally, the BARTIME literature review also found that inconvenient hours like weekend and night work, had gained ground and had often become obligatory under shift work arrangements (Doellgast & Berg, 2018; Ilsøe, 2010, 2011, 2012; Piasna et al., 2024). In the WageIndicator CBA Database, three types of premiums for inconvenient hours are coded: premiums for night work, for Sunday work, and for shift work. As Figure 14 shows, premiums are common in the collective agreements of most EU Member States, although this does differ across countries. In Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Malta and Sweden, premiums for Sunday work were more common than premiums for night- or shift work. In Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Poland, Romania and Slovakia opposite patterns were found: premiums for night- and shift work were far more common than premiums for Sunday work. The prevalence of premiums for work on Sunday also differ substantially across sectors (see Figure 15), which is intuitive given sectoral differences in the extent to which businesses are open on weekends. Notably, however, Sunday work premiums are also relatively uncommon in the hospitality and in the entertainment sectors, which often operate on weekends.




Figure 14 - Share of collective agreements with negotiated premiums for night work, work on Sunday and shift work, by country




Figure 15 - Share of collective agreements with negotiated premiums for night work, work on Sunday and shift work, by sector

In regard to the payment of premiums for Sunday and shift work, Figures 16 and 17 show that here, as in the case of overtime, the most common type of compensation is through extra pay.




Figure 16 - Types of compensation agreed for work on Sunday




Figure 17 - Types of compensation agreed work shift work

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Statistical appendix




Figure 18 - average daily working hours in collective agreements, by sector




Figure 19 - average monthly working hours in collective agreements, by sector




Figure 20 - average annual working hours in collective agreements, by sector




Figure 21 - average daily working hours in collective agreements, by country




Figure 22 - average monthly working hours in collective agreements, by country




Figure 23 - average annual working hours in collective agreements, by country